CAPSULE - IYKYK Newsroom
Project Binder · Version 2.0 · June 2026
CAPSULE
IYKYK Newsroom
Global Free Content Distribution Architecture
A zero-censorship, open-architecture global multimedia distribution network built to deliver free, uncensored, socially just, and culturally competent content to every human on the planet within 24 hours of origination broadcast — in 40+ languages, through 200+ nodes, across satellite, shortwave, P2P, mesh, and physical media.
Global reach
90%+
of world population within 24 hours
Languages at launch
40+
AI pipeline: Whisper + LibreTranslate
Distribution nodes
200+
platforms + 100+ human ops
Time to automation
<20 min
post-upload to global live
Year 1 budget
$50K–120K
minimum viable to full launch
Volunteer network
100+
ops across 6 continents
IYKYK — If You Know, You Know. Complete operational and strategic blueprint for CAPSULE. Repository: IYKYKNews.com · v2.0 — June 2026
Introduction
Executive Summary
CAPSULE — IYKYK Newsroom is a proposed global, open-architecture, zero-censorship multimedia content distribution network purpose-built to deliver free, uncensored, socially just, and culturally competent content to every human on the planet within 24 hours of origination broadcast.
The Problem
Approximately 3.5 billion people live under governments that actively restrict press freedom (Freedom House, 2024). An estimated 5 billion people lack meaningful access to independent, uncensored information in their native language. Marginalized communities — indigenous peoples, LGBTQIA+ populations, labor organizers, political dissidents, anti-war activists, climate advocates, and the global poor — are chronically underserved and actively suppressed by mainstream media infrastructure.
The Solution
CAPSULE is a three-tier, AI-augmented, cryptographically secured, globally redundant distribution architecture that simultaneously pushes content across 200+ digital platforms, terrestrial and satellite broadcast, shortwave radio, peer-to-peer networks, physical media, and mesh radio networks — making suppression by any single actor or jurisdiction technically impossible.
Version 2.0 integrates operational security standards from the EFF Surveillance Self-Defense program, the Freedom of the Press Foundation, the CPJ Digital Safety Kit, and the OpenNews Field Guide to Open Source in the Newsroom — providing a complete framework for both the network infrastructure and the human beings who operate it under adversarial conditions.
Sources: Freedom House 2024; ITU 2023; RSF 2024; CPJ 2024; EFF ssd.eff.org; freedom.press/digisec; cpj.org/safety-kit; fieldguide.opennews.org
Executive SummaryNext: Mission →
Section 1
Mission, Vision & Values
Mission Statement
CAPSULE exists to ensure that every human being on Earth has access to free, uncensored, socially just, and culturally competent information — free of cost, free of editorial interference, free of algorithmic suppression, and free of government or corporate control — delivered in their language, through any available medium, without exception.
Vision
A world in which no person — regardless of language, geography, internet access, incarceration status, economic status, or political environment — is more than 24 hours away from hearing a message that could save their life.
Non-Negotiable Values
| Value | Definition | What It Prohibits |
|---|---|---|
| Zero censorship | Content decisions are made by editorial standards, not by funders, governments, or platforms | Advertiser influence, government directives, platform algorithm compliance |
| Community first | Affected communities define what content they need | Top-down mandates, paternalistic framing, data extraction from communities |
| Radical accessibility | No financial, technological, or language barrier prevents access | Paywalls, app-only content, English-only distribution |
| Editorial independence | Newsroom makes all content decisions free from governance board influence | Funder-directed content, board veto over editorial decisions |
| Transparent operations | Governance, finances, and decision-making are publicly documented | Secret funders, undisclosed conflicts of interest, opaque algorithms |
| Harm reduction | Distribution of information about safer practices is always permitted | State propaganda framing, false balance on settled social justice questions |
| Cultural sovereignty | Indigenous and tribal communities hold authority over their own content | Appropriation, non-consensual use of sacred knowledge |
| Open source first | All CAPSULE-developed tooling is open source; proprietary dependencies are minimized and documented | Closed-source lock-in, undisclosed proprietary dependencies, opaque builds |
Content the Network Will Not Carry
- Content that sexualizes, exploits, or endangers children
- Disinformation designed to cause physical harm
- Incitement to violence against specific individuals or groups
- Content that violates the consent of identifiable individuals
- Advertising or paid promotional content not clearly labeled as such
Section 1Next: Distribution →
Section 2
Global Distribution Architecture
Three simultaneous, independent, self-reinforcing tiers. The failure or suppression of any one tier does not prevent global distribution.
1
~60%
Fires simultaneously the moment content is approved. All major streaming, social, and messaging platforms receive the file.
2
+20%
AI translates and re-voices into 40+ languages, seeds decentralized storage, fires automated radio ingest, propagates through P2P networks without further human action.
3
remainder
Penetrates conflict zones, authoritarian regimes, and regions with total internet shutdown. Requires no internet infrastructure at the receiving end.
Shortwave HF Radio Stations
| Station | Frequencies | Coverage | Airtime Cost | Audience |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| WRMI (World Radio Miami) | 5.85–15.77 MHz | Global — Americas, Europe, Africa | ~$200–400/hr | Millions globally |
| WWCR (Nashville) | 3.215–15.825 MHz | Global — strong N. America, Europe | ~$150–300/hr | Millions globally |
| WBCQ (Maine) | 5.13–15.42 MHz | Americas, Europe, Africa | ~$100–250/hr | Hundreds of thousands |
| BBC World Service HF | 3–26 MHz regional | 190 countries, 40 languages | Syndication partnership | 364M weekly (BBC 2024) |
| Voice of America | Multiple coordinated | 100+ countries | Partnership | 54M weekly (USAGM 2024) |
Path to 99% Global Penetration
| Segment | Size | Barrier | CAPSULE Solution | Timeline |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| No internet, has radio | 1.5B | No digital access | AM/FM/shortwave; community radio | Year 1 |
| Internet-censored regions | 1.3B | Government blocking | Domain fronting; Tor/I2P; IPFS; shortwave | Year 1 |
| No electricity | 770M | No power source | Solar receivers; battery radios; human relay | Year 2–3 |
| No radio, no internet, remote | 300M | No infrastructure | Satellite downlink; Othernet; physical via aid orgs | Year 2–4 |
| Incarcerated (global) | 11M | Controlled comms | IVR lines; physical media; facility partnerships | Year 1–2 |
Section 2Next: AI Pipeline →
Section 3
AI Production Pipeline & Automation
A single master audio upload triggers an automated pipeline producing 40+ language versions, platform-optimized clips, and simultaneous multi-tier distribution — in under 20 minutes with no human intervention after upload.
| # | Stage | Tool | Time | Cost |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Ingest & validate (SHA-256) | n8n webhook / Temporal.io | <10 sec | $0 |
| 2 | Transcode (MP3/AAC/OGG/FLAC) | FFmpeg 6.x | 30–90 sec | $0 |
| 3 | Transcription (95%+ accuracy English) | OpenAI Whisper large-v3 (local) | 2–20 min | $0 |
| 4 | Translation (40+ languages parallel) | LibreTranslate (self-hosted) | 3–8 min | $0 |
| 5 | Voice synthesis (27 language models) | Coqui TTS / XTTS-v2 | 5–15 min | $0 |
| 6 | Clip generation (60s/90s/audiogram) | FFmpeg + Python | 2–5 min | $0 |
| 7 | Metadata generation (all languages) | Claude API / local LLM | 1–3 min | ~$0.01–0.05/ep |
| 8 | Distribution trigger (all tiers parallel) | n8n parallel workflows | <30 sec | $0 |
| 9 | IPFS/Arweave pin | Kubo + Arweave-js | 2–5 min | ~$0.01/ep |
| 10 | Verification (5-min intervals) | Python monitoring script | Ongoing | $0 |
AI Localization Quality Control
| Tier | Languages | QC Method | Turnaround |
|---|---|---|---|
| Tier A High accuracy | English, Spanish, French, German, Portuguese, Italian, Dutch | Native speaker review before release | <2 hours |
| Tier B Good accuracy | Arabic, Mandarin, Hindi, Russian, Japanese, Korean, Turkish, Polish | AI reviewed; back-translation spot check | <4 hours |
| Tier C Acceptable | Swahili, Bengali, Urdu, Tagalog, Vietnamese, Thai, Indonesian + 22 more | AI output released with disclosure; community correction invited | Post-release |
| Political/cultural terms | All languages | Domain expert review required before any release | Required before release |
Section 3Next: Security →
Section 4
Security, Hardening & Defense Architecture
Threat Model
| Threat | Actor | Likelihood | Impact | Primary Defense |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Platform deplatforming | Commercial platform | High | Medium | 200+ redundant URLs; IPFS/Arweave permanent storage |
| Legal takedown (DMCA) | Corporate / government | Medium | Medium | Multi-jurisdiction hosting; IPFS immutability |
| DDoS attack | Hacktivists, state actors | Medium | Low–Medium | Cloudflare anycast; static CDN; IPFS/BT immune |
| Insider compromise | Infiltrator, coerced volunteer | Low–Medium | High | Compartmentalization; Shamir Secret Sharing; audits |
| Nation-state internet shutdown | Government | Low (regional) | Regional only | HF shortwave; satellite; mesh radio; physical |
| Credential compromise | Hackers, state actors | High | Low–Medium | YubiKey hardware keys (CPJ-recommended); zero-trust |
| Device seizure at protest/field | Law enforcement, hostile actors | Medium (field ops) | High if unencrypted | Full-disk encryption; strong PIN not biometric; data minimization before deployment (EFF SSD 2024) |
| Content tampering | Sophisticated adversary | Very low | High if undetected | SHA-256 verification; PGP signing; blockchain timestamp |
Zero-Trust Network Architecture
| Layer | Implementation | Tool | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| Identity | Hardware security keys for all admin access | YubiKey 5 Series | FIDO2/WebAuthn only; no SMS 2FA (CPJ Digital Safety Kit) |
| Network | Encrypted mesh VPN; admin traffic through VPN only | Tailscale (WireGuard) | IP allowlisting on all management ports |
| Secrets | All credentials in encrypted vault; no hardcoded keys | HashiCorp Vault 1.x | Automatic secret rotation; short-lived tokens |
| Certificates | All public HTTPS; HSTS preloaded; DNSSEC signed | Let's Encrypt + Cloudflare | TLS 1.3 minimum |
| Monitoring | All access logged; anomaly detection on admin actions | Prometheus + Loki + Grafana | Signal notification on anomaly |
| Physical | Air-gapped workstation for Shamir key operations | Dedicated offline machine | Never connected to internet; USB-boot only |
Censorship Bypass Techniques
| Technique | How It Works | Bypasses | Complexity |
|---|---|---|---|
| Domain fronting | Traffic routed through major CDN; true destination hidden in encrypted header | SNI-based blocking, DNS blocking | Low |
| Obfs4 / Snowflake (EFF SSD) | Tor traffic disguised as WebRTC; undetectable by DPI | Deep packet inspection, Tor blocking | Medium |
| IPFS gateway diversity | 50+ public gateways; if one blocked, others serve same CID | Single gateway blocking | Low |
| Meshtastic LoRa mesh | Sub-GHz radio mesh; no internet; 5–10km per node | Total internet shutdown | Medium |
| Shortwave HF radio | Ionospheric propagation; cannot be blocked without jamming entire HF band | All internet censorship | Low |
| Briar messenger | Peer-to-peer over Bluetooth, WiFi Direct, or Tor; no server | Internet shutdown; server seizure | Low |
Full journalist and activist OPSEC protocols — including device preparation, field communications, protest coverage, source protection, and emergency contacts — are in Section 4B, newly added in v2.0.
Section 4Next: Journalist & Activist OPSEC →
Section 4B — New in v2.0
Journalist & Activist Operational Security
Every person who operates a CAPSULE node, produces content, attends a protest to gather material, or handles source communications is a potential target. This section establishes minimum OPSEC standards for all participants — drawn from the EFF Surveillance Self-Defense program, the Freedom of the Press Foundation, and the CPJ Digital Safety Kit.
These protocols apply to all CAPSULE participants. Tier 1 access requires demonstrated competency in all of the following. Sources: EFF SSD Activist Playlist · EFF SSD: Attending a Protest (2024) · FPF Digital Security Education · CPJ Safety Kit
EFF Surveillance Self-Defense — Core Modules for All CAPSULE Participants
The EFF SSD Activist or Protester playlist covers eight modules that constitute the baseline OPSEC curriculum for all CAPSULE volunteers. All eight must be completed before Tier 1 access is granted:
| # | Module | Key CAPSULE Application |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | Creating Strong Passwords (ssd.eff.org) | Unique passwords via password manager for all CAPSULE platform accounts; never reuse; never use Google/Facebook SSO for operational accounts (CPJ) |
| 2 | Keeping Your Data Safe (ssd.eff.org) | Full-disk encryption on all devices before any operational role; encrypted backups; data minimization before field operations |
| 3 | Attending a Protest (ssd.eff.org — reviewed Nov. 2024) | Required for all field volunteers and journalists; device preparation checklist; PIN vs. biometric; confiscation response; printable pocket guide available as PDF |
| 4 | Your Security Plan (ssd.eff.org) | Each volunteer completes a personal threat model before onboarding; identifies assets, adversaries, and specific risks based on their role and location |
| 5 | Communicating With Others (ssd.eff.org) | Signal as primary for all sensitive CAPSULE communications; disappearing messages enabled; Matrix/Element for team coordination; no SMS for anything sensitive |
| 6 | Understanding and Circumventing Network Censorship (ssd.eff.org) | All Tier 1 volunteers must understand VPN, Tor, and IPFS as censorship circumvention tools relevant to their node operation responsibilities |
| 7 | Choosing Your Tools (ssd.eff.org) | Informs the CAPSULE open source toolchain selection; provides framework for evaluating new tools before adoption |
| 8 | Protecting Yourself on Social Networks (ssd.eff.org) | Required for all Tier 2 social amplifiers; platform privacy settings; understanding what "private" means on each platform; metadata in photos |
FPF Mobile Security — Nine Steps Before Any Action
Adapted from Freedom of the Press Foundation: "Mobile Security Tips: Nine Steps to Prepare Your Phone Before an Action" (freedom.press/digisec). Required for all field-deployed CAPSULE volunteers and journalists:
Before leaving for any field operation, protest, or sensitive interview
- Enable full-disk encryption. iOS: enabled by default when passcode is set. Android: Settings → Security & Privacy → Device Unlock → Screen lock. Use alphanumeric passcode. (EFF SSD: "Attending a Protest," Nov. 2024)
- Switch from biometric to strong PIN for protest situations. Law enforcement can compel fingerprint or face unlock; they cannot compel a PIN. 8–12 random characters. EFF SSD recommends this explicitly.
- Audit and minimize data on device. Remove contact lists, photos, notes, or documents that could identify sources or participants before field deployment. If your device is confiscated, assume everything on it is accessible. (CPJ Safety Kit)
- Enable two-factor authentication on all accounts. Hardware security key (YubiKey) preferred. Authenticator app as backup. Never SMS. CPJ recommends YubiKey as standard for journalists.
- Use a password manager. Long, unique passwords for all accounts. Never reuse. Never use Google/Facebook login for operational accounts. Phishing is the most common attack vector against journalists. (CPJ Digital Safety Kit)
- Review and revoke app permissions. Location, camera, microphone: revoke for any app that does not need it. Disable location services globally before a protest. (FPF mobile security protocol)
- Use Signal for all sensitive communications. Enable disappearing messages. Do not use SMS, WhatsApp, or Telegram for sensitive operational discussions. (EFF SSD)
- Back up all data before a field operation. Your device may be lost, damaged, confiscated, or destroyed. Nothing irreplaceable should exist only on the device you carry into the field. (FPF)
- Know your legal contact before you leave. Write a trusted attorney's number on your arm in permanent marker. Have the NLG or local legal observer hotline memorized or written physically separate from your phone.
Communications Security Standards
Encrypted messaging
Signal for all sensitive CAPSULE communications. Enable disappearing messages (7-day max for operational discussions). Matrix/Element (self-hosted) for team coordination. Session for participants who cannot safely link a phone number. Never use unencrypted SMS, Discord, or Slack for anything sensitive.
Email security
PGP (GnuPG) for all external sensitive communications. ProtonMail or Tutanota for email when PGP is not practical. Never send source-identifying information over unencrypted email. Use a password manager — phishing is the primary attack vector against journalists (CPJ).
Account hardening
YubiKey hardware key as primary 2FA for all accounts. Authenticator app as backup. Unique email addresses per platform role. Review social media privacy settings regularly — what you post "privately" may not be private to the platform operator (CPJ, EFF SSD).
Network security
WireGuard/Tailscale VPN for all administrative tasks. Tor Browser for anonymous browsing and source intake. Never perform sensitive operations on public WiFi without VPN. Understand network censorship circumvention tools — EFF SSD Module 6 is required for all Tier 1 volunteers.
Source protection
SecureDrop (FPF-developed) for anonymous source intake. Signal for direct source contact. Never store source-identifying information in cloud services or on devices carried to protests. Compartmentalize — sources should not know about other sources. Minimize metadata. (EFF SSD; FPF)
Social media OPSEC
Audit all platform privacy settings before any sensitive operation. Do not photograph or identify protest participants without explicit consent. Disable geotagging on all photos. Deleted posts are often not truly deleted server-side. Review audience access settings on every platform. (EFF SSD Module 8)
Protest and Field Coverage Protocols
Based on EFF Digital Security Advice for Journalists Covering Protests (2020) and CPJ Safety Advisory for covering US protests over police violence.
At the scene — field operator and journalist protocols
- Carry the minimum necessary device. Consider a dedicated "protest phone" with no personal data, no personal accounts, and biometric unlock disabled. (EFF)
- Document equipment serial numbers before departure. If equipment is seized, serial numbers aid recovery claims.
- Know your legal rights. Journalists have press freedom protections; protesters have First Amendment protections. Both can be arrested. Neither should assume police will distinguish them. (CPJ)
- Immediately back up captured media to encrypted cloud or trusted person outside the scene as you work. Theft, damage, or confiscation can destroy your ability to publish. (EFF SSD)
- If arrested, do not unlock your device. Fifth Amendment protection against self-incrimination. Politely decline and immediately ask for an attorney. (EFF)
- If your device is confiscated, treat it as permanently compromised. Change all passwords and revoke all tokens from another device immediately upon release. (CPJ)
- Coordinate with a base contact who is not at the scene. Check in at regular intervals. If check-ins stop, base contact escalates to legal assistance protocols.
- Do not photograph faces of protest participants without explicit consent unless they are public figures in newsworthy conduct. Facial recognition is used routinely by law enforcement. (EFF)
Emergency Assistance Contacts
| Organization | What They Provide | Contact |
|---|---|---|
| Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ) | Emergency assistance, legal referrals, digital/physical safety consultations, financial emergency support for journalists in distress | cpj.org/journalist-safety-and-emergencies · WhatsApp: +1 206 590 6191 |
| Freedom of the Press Foundation (FPF) | Digital security training, SecureDrop setup, device security audits, press freedom advocacy. Request a training: freedom.press/digisec/programs/training-request-form | freedom.press/digisec |
| Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press | Free legal support, First Amendment representation, legal hotline for journalists (1-800-336-4243) | rcfp.org |
| Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) | Digital rights legal support, SSD resources, FOIA assistance, Atlas of Surveillance | eff.org · ssd.eff.org |
| National Lawyers Guild (NLG) | Legal observers at protests, arrestee support hotlines, First Amendment legal defense | nlg.org · local chapter hotlines at events |
| Access Now Digital Security Helpline | 24/7 digital security help for journalists and activists under attack: account recovery, malware, surveillance | accessnow.org/help |
This section contains general guidance and does not constitute legal advice. Participants facing arrest, device seizure, or credible threats should immediately contact an attorney and one of the organizations listed above.
Section 4BNext: Open Source Governance →
Section 4C — New in v2.0
Open Source Governance Framework
CAPSULE is built entirely on open source infrastructure and is committed to contributing back to the commons. This section adapts the OpenNews Field Guide to Open Source in the Newsroom — a collaborative resource authored by 25+ newsroom developers and technologists — to CAPSULE's specific operational context.
Source: The Field Guide to Open Source in the Newsroom — OpenNews, 2016–present. MIT License. This section applies Field Guide principles to CAPSULE's distributed, adversarially-targeted, mission-driven context.
Why Open Source Is Non-Negotiable for CAPSULE
Security through transparency
Proprietary code cannot be audited by CAPSULE's volunteer security community. Closed-source dependencies create supply chain risks. "Given enough eyeballs, all bugs are shallow" (Linus's Law) applies directly to adversarially-targeted infrastructure. (OpenNews Field Guide Ch. 1)
Censorship resistance through replication
Open source code can be forked, mirrored, and operated by anyone. If CAPSULE's primary infrastructure is seized or shut down, the open source codebase ensures any operator anywhere can rebuild the network from published specifications. (Field Guide Ch. 1)
Community trust and accountability
Communities served by CAPSULE have a right to inspect the tools used to collect, process, and distribute content that touches their lives. Open source code is the technical implementation of the transparency value in Section 1. (Field Guide Ch. 1)
Sustainability through contribution
CAPSULE depends on 30+ open source projects. Contributing improvements back upstream reduces unmaintained fork risk, builds relationships with developer communities that maintain security, and fulfills the reciprocal obligation that comes with using the commons. (Field Guide Ch. 6)
Eight Field Guide Chapters Applied to CAPSULE
Ch.1
Choosing Open Source & Getting Buy-In
CAPSULE's open source commitment must be established in the founding charter, volunteer agreements, and editorial standards document. Buy-in must come from the Community Advisory Council, Editorial Board, and Technical Advisory Board before code is written. The Field Guide identifies the key stakeholders — legal/PR, leadership, funders, developers — each with different concerns that must be addressed. (Field Guide Ch. 1)
Ch.2
Starting New Projects
All CAPSULE-developed code must begin with: a clear license (MIT or Apache 2.0 preferred), a README (what it does, how to run it), a CONTRIBUTING.md (clear contribution guidelines), a CODE_OF_CONDUCT.md, and a documented release definition. The license is chosen before the first line of code. (Field Guide Ch. 2)
Ch.3
Opening Up Existing Projects
Any existing CAPSULE tooling being open-sourced must be sanitized before release: remove all API keys and credentials (use environment variables); scrub git history for committed secrets; document all dependencies; remove internal organizational references; establish a public issue tracker. The Field Guide provides specific checklists. (Field Guide Ch. 3)
Ch.4
Code Quality & First Release
Minimum quality bar before public release: tests with at least 70% coverage; documentation allowing an unfamiliar developer to run it in under 30 minutes; no committed secrets in git history; semantic versioning; CI/CD pipeline running tests on every commit. The first public release is a commitment, not a draft. Run Open Project Linter (github.com/OpenNewsLabs/open-project-linter) before release. (Field Guide Ch. 4)
Ch.5
Documentation Standards
All CAPSULE tools require: README (what it does, install, run, contribute); architecture documentation (how pieces fit); API documentation (what each endpoint does); runbook documentation (how to operate in production, including failure scenarios); and CHANGELOG. Documentation is part of "done" — no release ships without it. (Field Guide Ch. 5)
Ch.6
Working With Community
CAPSULE's volunteer contributor community is the security and sustainability backstop of the entire project. Community management requires: enforced CODE_OF_CONDUCT; clear issue triage process; defined PR response time commitments; contributor recognition; and a transparent decision-making process for accepting or declining contributions. A hostile or unresponsive maintainer community kills projects. (Field Guide Ch. 6)
Ch.7
Managing Releases
For adversarially-targeted infrastructure, release management has additional requirements: cryptographic signing of all release artifacts (GPG); published checksums for all downloadable packages; a security disclosure process (responsible disclosure / CVE coordination); a communication plan for emergency security releases; and a defined deprecation process for old versions with known vulnerabilities. Every release is a security event. (Field Guide Ch. 7)
Ch.8
Handoffs & Sunsets
CAPSULE's zero-single-point-of-failure architecture requires formal handoff protocols for all maintained code: documented maintainer succession plans; transfer of signing keys through documented process; archived repositories accessible even if the primary maintainer is unavailable; and a sunset protocol ensuring continued operation of the distributed network even if CAPSULE's central coordination ceases to exist. The network must be able to outlive any individual organization. (Field Guide Ch. 8)
License Policy
| Code Type | Recommended License | Rationale |
|---|---|---|
| Core infrastructure tools | Apache 2.0 or MIT | Maximum reuse; permissive; compatible with most licenses; patent protection (Apache 2.0) |
| Editorial and governance documents | Creative Commons CC BY 4.0 | Allows reuse with attribution; standard for journalism documents; used by CPJ for their Digital Safety Kit (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0) |
| Content produced by CAPSULE | Creative Commons CC BY-SA 4.0 | Ensures content remains free and shareable; ShareAlike prevents proprietary enclosure |
| Security and OPSEC tools | MIT or CC0 (public domain) | Maximum reuse; no compatibility concerns; OPSEC tools should have zero adoption barriers |
The OpenNews Field Guide is itself MIT licensed and was built collaboratively during a two-day event in December 2016 with approximately 20 people working in-person and remote — a model directly applicable to CAPSULE's distributed production methodology. Source: fieldguide.opennews.org
Section 4CNext: Human Capital →
Section 5
Human Capital, Volunteer Network & Coalition
Minimum Viable Core Team
| Role | Key Responsibilities | Background Required | Compensation |
|---|---|---|---|
| Executive Producer | Final editorial authority; mission stewardship; external relationships; answers Q100 | Journalism, activism, or media; leadership in social justice or press freedom | $60–80K/yr |
| Senior Engineer | Deploy and operate all infrastructure; automation pipeline; security patching; on-call; open source community management (OpenNews Field Guide) | DevOps/SRE; Linux; Docker/K8s; Python; networking; open source community experience | $70–90K/yr |
| Movement Lawyer | Legal entity; volunteer agreements; content liability; jurisdiction strategy; press freedom; EFF/RCFP/NLG relationships | First Amendment, media law, or digital rights; nonprofit or pro bono media experience | $3–5K/mo retainer |
| Community Organizer | Volunteer recruitment; coalition relationships; trust-building; DEI accountability; OPSEC training coordination | Organizing in aligned communities; knowledge of CPJ/FPF/EFF safety frameworks for volunteer training | $50–65K/yr |
| Funding Lead | Grant writing; donor relations; budget management; financial controls | Nonprofit development; mission-aligned fundraising; familiarity with press freedom and digital rights funders | Salary or % of raised |
OPSEC Training Requirements by Volunteer Tier
| Tier | Required Training | Verification | Cadence |
|---|---|---|---|
| Tier 1 (Core Ops) | Full EFF SSD Activist Playlist (all 8 modules); FPF mobile security 9-step checklist; CPJ Digital Safety Kit; Shamir key ceremony training; full-disk encryption verified on all devices; YubiKey configured on all accounts | Demonstrated competency assessment; security audit of devices and accounts by SecOps Lead | Annual re-certification; immediate update on new threat advisories |
| Tier 2 (Distribution Ops) | EFF SSD "Attending a Protest" module; EFF SSD "Protecting Yourself on Social Networks"; FPF mobile security checklist; Signal with disappearing messages; YubiKey or TOTP 2FA on all accounts | Checklist confirmation; Signal verification call | Annual; immediate update on major platform security changes |
| Tier 3 (Community) | EFF SSD "Protecting Yourself on Social Networks"; basic password hygiene; understanding what NOT to share in their distribution role | Written acknowledgment of protocols | Annual |
Subject Matter Expert Communities
| Community | Primary Contribution | Specific Expertise | Engagement |
|---|---|---|---|
| White hat / ethical hackers | Security auditing; pen testing; vulnerability disclosure; supply chain review (Field Guide Ch. 6) | CVE monitoring; red team; code audit; zero-day awareness | Quarterly audit; bug bounty |
| Anonymous / hacktivist community | OPSEC culture; Tor/I2P ops; censorship bypass testing | OPSEC audit; anonymity tools; operational tradecraft | Advisory; anonymous channel |
| Ex-intelligence (SIGINT/INFOSEC) | Traffic analysis; metadata hygiene; adversarial modeling | NSA/GCHQ tradecraft applied to civilian defense | Paid consultant; identity protected |
| Open source activists | Dependency auditing; fork maintenance; supply chain; upstream contribution (Field Guide Ch. 6) | EFF, FSF, Open Source Initiative community | Volunteer contributor; advisory board |
| Ex-military (comms/signals) | HF/satellite backup design; degraded comms protocols | Signal Corps; military communications specialists | Paid consultant; hardware testing |
| Freelance / independent journalists | Verification; source protection; editorial standards; field OPSEC (CPJ Safety Kit) | War correspondents; investigative; foreign correspondents | Editorial board; content partner |
| Labor unions | Governance models; collective decision-making; solidarity networks | AFL-CIO; CWA; WGA | Institutional partner; potential funder |
| Indigenous and tribal activists | Sovereign network access; community trust; cultural content authority | AIROS; Native Public Media; tribal councils | Co-governance seat; content partnership |
| LGBTQIA+ leaders | Underground network experience; community trust; content strategy | GLAAD; NCTE; local orgs | Advisory board; distribution partnership |
| Anti-fascist networks | Disinformation monitoring; harassment defense; infiltration detection | Hope Not Hate; ADL; community intelligence | Security advisory; threat intelligence |
| Multinational aid organizations | Crisis zone logistics; community relationships; physical infrastructure | MSF; IRC; Oxfam; regional NGOs | Infrastructure sharing; MOU |
Section 5Next: Governance →
Section 6
Governance, Legal Structure & Accountability
Recommended Legal Structure
| Model | Jurisdiction | Pros | Cons | Recommended For |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 501(c)(3) nonprofit | United States | Tax-deductible donations; established framework | Subject to US law; IRS oversight | Primary US operations |
| Multi-stakeholder cooperative | Colorado / ICA model | Democratic governance; community ownership; harder to capture | Less familiar to funders | Governance layer above nonprofit |
| International NGO (ANBI) | Netherlands | Strong press freedom; EU GDPR; international credibility | EU regulatory environment | European and global operations |
| Hybrid (US + NL) | US + Netherlands | US fundraising + EU operational independence | Dual compliance cost | Recommended at scale |
Governance Structure
| Body | Composition | Authority | Decision Threshold |
|---|---|---|---|
| Community Advisory Council | 10 seats: indigenous (2), LGBTQIA+ (2), labor (2), social justice (2), press freedom (2) | Ratify values charter; approve major editorial policy; hold EP accountable | Simple majority; supermajority for charter changes |
| Editorial Board | 5 independent journalists with no financial relationship to network | Final authority on content standards; editorial independence enforcement | Consensus preferred; majority vote allowed |
| Technical Advisory Board | 3 security professionals + 2 infrastructure engineers + Open Source Steward (v2.0 addition) | Security audit approval; architecture review; incident response; open source release authorization | Majority vote |
| Open Source Steward (new v2.0) | 1 senior engineer designated; reports to Technical Advisory Board | Manages public repositories; approves community contributions; coordinates CVE disclosures; maintains dependency audit | Unilateral within TAB-approved policy |
| Executive Producer | 1 individual; serves at pleasure of Community Advisory Council | Day-to-day editorial and operational authority | Unilateral within ratified policies |
| SecOps Lead | 1 individual; identity protected; reports to Technical Advisory Board | Security operations; incident response; access control; OPSEC training certification | Unilateral on security actions; reports within 24 hours |
Shamir Secret Sharing — Key Management
| Key | Threshold | Shard Holders | Recovery |
|---|---|---|---|
| Master distribution trigger | 3 of 5 | EP, Deputy EP, SecOps Lead, Legal Counsel, Advisory Chair | Emergency meeting; identity verification; 72-hour reconstruction |
| Infrastructure admin | 2 of 3 | Senior Engineer, SecOps Lead, EP | 48-hour process; dual verification required |
| Open source signing key (new v2.0) | 2 of 3 | Open Source Steward, Senior Engineer, SecOps Lead | Emergency key ceremony; air-gapped workstation; 48-hour process |
| Dead man's switch override | 1 of 1 (time-based) | EP heartbeat signal | Automatic if no signal for 72 hours |
Section 6Next: Budget →
Section 7
Budget Model & Financial Sustainability
Minimum viable
$50K–65K
Year 1 run rate: $120K–160K
Fully staffed launch
$90K–130K
Year 1 run rate: $220K–300K
Full scale (Year 2+)
—
Year 2+ run rate: $350K–500K
90-Day Launch Budget — v2.0 line items
| Category | Item | Cost (90 days) | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| Personnel | Executive Producer (FT) | $15,000–20,000 | $65K/yr prorated |
| Personnel | Senior Engineer (FT) | $18,000–22,500 | $80K/yr prorated |
| Personnel | Community Organizer (FT) | $12,500–16,250 | $55K/yr prorated |
| Personnel | Movement Lawyer (retainer) | $9,000–15,000 | $3–5K/mo retainer |
| Personnel | Funding Lead (contract) | $7,500–12,000 | Commission on raised |
| Infrastructure | Cloud hosting (3 regions) | $1,500–3,000 | AWS/GCP/Hetzner |
| Infrastructure | CDN (Cloudflare) | $600–1,200 | $200–400/mo |
| Infrastructure | Satellite uplink + shortwave airtime | $2,000–5,000 | WRMI/WWCR test buys; Iridium terminal |
| Hardware | Studio kit (mics, interface, recorder, UPS) | $2,000–4,000 | One-time capital |
| Hardware | YubiKeys — core team (10 units) | $500–800 | CPJ-recommended; FIDO2/WebAuthn; ~$50–80 each |
| Security | Independent penetration test + open source code audit | $5,000–15,000 | Critical before launch; includes Field Guide Ch.4 compliance review |
| Security — NEW v2.0 | OPSEC training program (EFF SSD + FPF + CPJ curriculum) | $1,000–3,000 | FPF training request; EFF SSD materials (free); CPJ Safety Kit (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0) |
| Legal | Entity formation and legal review | $3,000–8,000 | Nonprofit + cooperative structure; press freedom specialist |
| Open Source — NEW v2.0 | Open source program setup (repos, CI/CD, docs toolchain, license compliance) | $500–2,000 | GitHub/Gitea; Open Project Linter setup; contributor onboarding per Field Guide Ch.2–4 |
| Operations | Volunteer stipends (Tier 1, 20 people) | $3,000–6,000 | $50–100/mo nominal |
| Operations | Translation reviewers (40 languages) | $2,400–4,800 | $20–40/language/month |
| Operations | Contingency (15%) | ~$9,500–18,000 | Standard PM reserve |
Revenue and Funding Model
Policy: No single funding source may constitute more than 15% of annual operating budget. All funders contributing $5,000+ are publicly disclosed. This policy applies regardless of how the funds are structured. (OpenNews Field Guide Ch.1 fundraising guidance)
| Source | Type | Year 1 Target | Risk |
|---|---|---|---|
| Individual small donations | Recurring | $20,000–40,000 | Low — distributed |
| Foundation grants (press freedom, digital rights) | Project-based | $30,000–80,000 | Medium — grant cycle dependent |
| Labor union institutional support | Annual commitment | $10,000–25,000 | Low — relationship-based |
| Cooperative membership fees (orgs) | Annual recurring | $5,000–15,000 | Low — diversified |
| In-kind infrastructure contributions | Non-cash | $15,000–30,000 equiv. | Low — volunteer-based |
| Speaking engagement fees (EP) | Variable | $5,000–20,000 | Variable |
Section 7Next: 90-Day Plan →
Section 8
90-Day Activation Plan
Each phase has a hard gate. The network does not proceed to the next phase until all gate criteria are met and documented. The Community Advisory Council holds veto power over any phase advancement.
Day 1–7 · Phase 0
Foundation
Legal entity formed and registered. Core team contracted. All 100 due diligence questions answered in writing. Open source repositories initialized with LICENSE, README, CONTRIBUTING.md, and CODE_OF_CONDUCT.md per OpenNews Field Guide Ch. 2. OPSEC baseline assessment (EFF SSD Module 4: Your Security Plan) completed by all founding team members. Gate: Entity registered; bank account open; all 5 roles filled; repos public; all docs committed.
Day 8–21 · Phase 1
Build
Full technical stack deployed in staging. Automation pipeline tested end-to-end. Version control (Git), public issue tracker, semantic versioning, and CI/CD pipeline established per Field Guide Ch. 4. First candidate open source release prepared and run through Open Project Linter. Gate: Pipeline processes test file in under 20 minutes; all Tier 1 platforms receive test content; monitoring dashboard live; first code release signed, checksummed, and passes Open Project Linter.
Day 22–42 · Phase 2
Harden
Independent security audit and penetration test. Legal review of content liability across top-20 jurisdictions. First 20 Tier 1 volunteers onboarded, verified, and certified on full EFF SSD Activist Playlist + FPF 9-step mobile security protocol + CPJ Digital Safety Kit. All YubiKeys distributed and configured. Dependency audit completed. SecureDrop instance live. Gate: All critical and high-severity security findings remediated; 20 volunteers OPSEC-certified with documented proof; SecureDrop functional; failover tested successfully.
Day 43–63 · Phase 3
Community
Coalition consultations conducted with indigenous communities, LGBTQIA+ orgs, labor unions. 60 additional volunteers onboarded with tier-appropriate OPSEC training. Open source contributor guidelines ratified by Technical Advisory Board per Field Guide Ch. 6. Codes of conduct published and enforced. Community advisory council fully seated. Gate: 50+ volunteers active and OPSEC-verified; 5+ MOUs signed with coalition partners; indigenous community consultation documented and approved by relevant sovereign bodies.
Day 64–77 · Phase 4
Test
Full-scale global distribution simulation. Dead man's switch test (verified to trigger at 72-hour lapse). OPSEC red team exercise against full volunteer network. Open source release management rehearsal with signing key ceremony. All 100 due diligence Q&A validated. Gate: Simulation achieves 85%+ of target geographic and platform metrics; no critical security failures; OPSEC red team audit passed; release signing process verified.
Day 78–89 · Phase 5
Pre-launch
Final go/no-go review against all 12 criteria. First content approved by Editorial Board. Open source codebase fully public. OPSEC training materials published publicly at IYKYKNews.com/security under CC BY 4.0 — following the OpenNews Field Guide principle that safety resources should have zero barriers to adoption. Launch communications prepared. Gate: Community Advisory Council approves launch by vote; Editorial Board approves first content by vote; all 12 go/no-go criteria met.
Day 90 · LAUNCH
First live global broadcast of CAPSULE — IYKYK Newsroom
90%+ global reach achieved within 24 hours of broadcast. Measurement dashboard confirms delivery across all three tiers. Open source codebase fully public with all documentation per Field Guide Ch. 5. OPSEC resources live at IYKYKNews.com/security. Community begins producing content for second broadcast.
Go / No-Go Criteria (Day 89) — All 12 must be true
- Legal entity registered and operational bank account open
- All 5 core team roles filled with named, contracted individuals
- Full technical stack deployed, tested, and independently security-audited
- All critical and high-severity security findings remediated and documented
- 100+ volunteer network active with 20+ Tier 1 operators OPSEC-certified
- Community Advisory Council convened with quorum of community representatives
- Editorial Board ratified content standards document
- At least one piece of content fully produced, reviewed, and approved for broadcast
- All 100 due diligence questions answered in writing to 88%+ confidence
- Legal clearance confirmed for distribution activities in at least top-50 jurisdictions
- Disaster recovery and failover tested successfully in full simulation
- EP has answered Q100 honestly and in writing — not to this document, but to themselves
Section 8Next: Metrics →
Section 9
Measurement, Metrics & Long-Term Success
Distribution Metrics Framework
| Metric | Definition | Source | Frequency | Year 1 Target |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Country coverage | Countries with confirmed listener activity | CDN GeoIP + podcast analytics | Daily | 180+ of 195 countries |
| Unique listeners (digital) | Unduplicated listeners, 30-day window | Spotify/Apple/Amazon APIs; CDN logs | Monthly | 100,000+ |
| Download events | Total file downloads across all platforms | Unified analytics dashboard | Daily | 500,000+/month |
| IPFS peer count | Active nodes storing and serving content | IPFS swarm API | Every 30 min | 500+ peers |
| Mirror health | % of 200+ URLs returning 200 OK | Uptime Kuma + custom checker | Every 5 min | 99%+ uptime |
| Time to 90% reach | Hours from broadcast to 90% country coverage | Real-time GeoIP dashboard | Per-episode | <24 hours |
| Shortwave reception reports | SINPO cards and online reports | Listener reporting form | Per-broadcast | 50+ reports/broadcast |
| OPSEC incidents | Security incidents reported by volunteer network | SecOps incident log | Per-event | 100% documented response rate |
| Open source contributors | Unique contributors to public CAPSULE repositories | GitHub/Gitea API | Monthly | 20+ contributors by end of Year 1 |
| Open source dependency health | % of dependencies with no outstanding critical CVEs | Automated scan (Dependabot) | Weekly | 100% at all times |
Due Diligence Readiness
Mission, Vision, Values (12)
10
Governance & Accountability (12)
8
Finance & Sustainability (12)
7
Technical Architecture (14)
10
Legal & Regulatory (12)
6
Metrics & Impact (12)
9
People & Culture (12)
8
Execution & 90-Day Plan (14)
12
Current readiness: 70 of 100 questions fully answered. 15 in active development. 15 require Phase 1–3 work to complete. Probability of achieving 88%+ confidence threshold by Day 89: achievable with full team activation and proper OPSEC + open source governance infrastructure in place.
Section 9Next: 100 Questions →
Section 10
Due Diligence: 100 Questions
The full due diligence framework for funders, institutional partners, and decision-makers. Each question is assigned a voice representing the type of stakeholder most likely to ask it. Questions marked ⚠ Open require resolution before the Day 89 go/no-go.
Mission, Vision, and Values (Q1–12)
Q1
Labor leader
What is the single sentence mission?
✓ Complete — See Section 1. Mission Statement ratified at founding and version-controlled in public repository.
Q2
Religious leader
What are the non-negotiable values?
✓ Complete — See Section 1.3 Values Charter — 8 values including Open Source First (added v2.0), community-ratified, version-controlled.
Q3
Legacy journalist
How is "free content" defined, and who resolves disputes?
✓ Complete — Free of cost, free of editorial interference, free of algorithmic suppression. Conflicts resolved by Editorial Board per ratified content standards.
Q4
Indigenous leader
Was this built with communities or for them?
⚠ Open — Phase 3 — Community consultation protocol required before launch. Design must be ratified by communities served before activation. This is a go/no-go criteria item.
Q5
Trial lawyer
What content will the network refuse, and who decides?
✓ Complete — See Section 1.4. Four narrow categories. All others presumptively permitted. Editorial Board decides; Community Advisory Council can ratify changes to categories by supermajority.
Q6
Legacy broadcaster
How is this substantively different from what already exists?
✓ Complete — No existing infrastructure simultaneously provides: zero-censorship social justice editorial mandate + 40+ language AI localization + shortwave/satellite/mesh bypass + open source first (OpenNews Field Guide compliant) + EFF/FPF/CPJ OPSEC-trained volunteer network + global 24-hour reach + community sovereignty over editorial decisions.
Q7
Ex-intelligence officer
What is the actual, specific threat model?
✓ Complete — See Section 4 Threat Model: 8 categories with likelihood, impact, and primary defense mapped. Includes device seizure at protests (EFF SSD 2024) and supply chain attacks (Field Guide Ch. 4).
Q8
Spiritual leader
What does success look like in human terms, not metrics?
✓ Complete — A person in a prison cell in a country with no internet access, who speaks a language no major media organization serves, hears a message in their language that tells them they are not alone and that help exists. That is the minimum viable success case.
Q9
Labor leader
Who benefits financially, and who controls the money?
✓ Complete — No individual extracts profit. Revenue funds operations and worker salaries. Surplus funds reserve and expansion. Full financial transparency policy: all funders over $5K publicly disclosed. Independent financial audit annually.
Q10
Activist leader
What happens when mission succeeds, or when CAPSULE is no longer needed?
✓ Complete — Network evolves to permanent commons. Open source codebase (MIT/Apache 2.0) per Field Guide Ch. 8 handoff protocols ensures anyone can operate the network. Governance transitions to full community cooperative ownership. EP role dissolves into rotating stewardship.
Q11
International judge
Has legal analysis been done on operating in 195 jurisdictions simultaneously?
⚠ Open — Phase 1 (Day 21 deadline) — Framework in Section 6. Full jurisdiction-by-jurisdiction analysis by movement lawyer required by Day 21 of Phase 1 before system goes live even in staging.
Q12
Religious leader
How are conflicting cultural or sacred content claims between communities handled?
✓ Complete — Cultural Sovereignty policy (Section 1) + Community Advisory Council adjudication. Indigenous sacred knowledge requires affirmative consent from relevant sovereign body before distribution. No internal CAPSULE party can override a community's own cultural authority.
Governance and Accountability (Q13–24)
Q13
Foundation director
Who actually holds power when there is a serious disagreement?
✓ Complete — On editorial matters: Editorial Board. On mission and values: Community Advisory Council. On security matters: Technical Advisory Board + SecOps Lead. On operations: EP. No single person or body holds all power; this is by design and is documented in the Governance Charter.
Q14
Foundation director
Does a formal governance document exist, signed and ratified?
⚠ Open — Phase 0 (Day 7 deadline) — Framework complete in Section 6. Legal entity must exist before the governance document can be formally ratified. Day 7 hard gate.
Q15–24
Multiple
Remaining governance questions (funder conflicts, removal processes, compensation transparency, conflict of interest policies, whistleblower protection, financial controls, audit requirements, board diversity, term limits, succession planning)
⚠ 7 of 10 complete, 3 require legal entity formation — All policies designed; 3 require formal legal ratification once entity is established.
Finance and Sustainability (Q25–36)
Q25
Foundation director
Is the budget real — based on actual quotes and commitments?
✓ Complete — All budget line items in Section 7 are based on publicly available pricing (AWS, Cloudflare, WRMI, YubiKey, etc.) and standard nonprofit salary ranges. No speculative figures. Hardware costs are direct retail prices as of June 2026.
Q26–36
Multiple
Remaining finance questions (Year 2+ runway, reserve policy, funder cap enforcement mechanism, revenue diversification, grant reporting, financial controls, audit policy, currency risk for international ops, volunteer compensation equity, IP ownership policy, insurance)
⚠ 6 of 11 complete, 5 require legal entity and first funder — Frameworks designed; implementation requires entity formation and initial funding commitment.
Technical Architecture (Q37–50)
Q37
Chief security officer
Has an independent security audit been completed?
⚠ Open — Phase 2 (Day 42 deadline) — Scope defined in Section 4. Budget allocated ($5K–$15K). Audit firm not yet selected. This is a hard go/no-go gate; no launch proceeds without completed audit with all critical findings remediated.
Q38
Open source developer
Does the codebase meet the OpenNews Field Guide quality standards for open source release?
⚠ Open — Phase 1 (Day 21) — Standards defined in Section 4C (Field Guide Ch. 4): 70% test coverage minimum; sub-30-minute onboarding; no committed secrets; semantic versioning; CI/CD on every commit; passes Open Project Linter. This is a Phase 1 gate criterion.
Q39–50
Multiple
Remaining technical questions (infrastructure redundancy, disaster recovery RPO/RTO, IPFS node distribution, satellite failover, Shamir key ceremony documentation, model hash verification, dependency audit cadence, incident response runbook, monitoring SLAs, shortwave license compliance, CDN contract terms, HF antenna specifications)
✓ 9 of 12 complete / ⚠ 3 require Phase 1 build
Legal and Regulatory (Q51–62)
Q51
Trial lawyer
What is CAPSULE's actual legal liability exposure, and is it understood?
⚠ Open — requires movement lawyer — Framework in Section 6. Full liability analysis — defamation, incitement, copyright, national security law across 195 jurisdictions — requires the movement lawyer role filled by Day 7 and completed by Day 21.
Q52–62
Multiple
Remaining legal questions (GDPR/data protection, FCC licensing for any US-transmitted content, shortwave broadcast contracts, volunteer liability waivers, source protection legal framework, press credentials policy, content licensing for rebroadcast, FOIA exposure, cross-border data transfer compliance, employment law for international volunteers, trademark)
⚠ 4 of 11 complete, 7 require movement lawyer engagement
People, Culture, and OPSEC (Q63–74) — New in v2.0
Q63
Security researcher
What happens if a Tier 1 volunteer is arrested with their CAPSULE device?
✓ Complete — Protocol in Section 4B: Do not unlock device. Invoke Fifth Amendment. Request attorney immediately. Treat device as permanently compromised upon release. Change all credentials from another device immediately. Base contact escalates to legal assistance (NLG/RCFP hotlines). (EFF; CPJ)
Q64
Security researcher
What OPSEC standard governs volunteer device security?
✓ Complete — Full EFF SSD Activist Playlist (8 modules) + FPF 9-step mobile security protocol + CPJ Digital Safety Kit for all Tier 1. Tier 2 and 3 have proportionally scaled requirements. All documented in Section 4B and Section 5.
Q65–74
Multiple
Remaining people/OPSEC questions (volunteer burnout protocol, psychological safety for trauma-exposed journalists, source witness protection, infiltrator detection, community moderator wellbeing, volunteer exit procedures, credential revocation on departure, role rotation policy, anonymous volunteer participation, contributor diversity metrics)
✓ 6 of 10 complete / ⚠ 4 require Phase 3 community consultation
Metrics, Impact, and Accountability (Q75–86)
Q75–86
Multiple
Impact metrics, listener verification methodology, language accuracy measurement, shortwave reach verification (SINPO), community feedback mechanisms, content impact tracking, open source contribution metrics (Field Guide Ch. 6), funder reporting cadence, independent impact evaluation, community ownership transition metrics, long-term sustainability indicators, and mission drift detection protocols
✓ 8 of 12 complete — See Section 9 Metrics Framework. Open source contributor metrics added in v2.0 per OpenNews Field Guide Ch. 6 community health indicators.
Execution and 90-Day Plan (Q87–99)
Q87
Foundation director
Is the 90-day plan specific, dated, and realistic?
✓ Complete — See Section 8. Six phases, each with documented gate criteria. Budget allocated. Go/no-go 12-point checklist explicit and measurable. Field Guide Ch. 4 code quality gates and EFF/FPF/CPJ OPSEC certification milestones are integrated phase gate requirements.
Q88–99
Multiple
Remaining execution questions (first broadcast content decision process, contingency for Phase 2 security audit failure, volunteer attrition contingency, technical lead succession, funding gap contingency, coalition partner fallout contingency, legal crisis protocol, EP incapacitation protocol, platform-specific account recovery, open source community conflict resolution (Field Guide Ch. 6), post-launch iteration process, year 2 planning triggers)
✓ 9 of 12 complete / ⚠ 3 require Phase 1 team to finalize
The seven questions any serious partner will require near-certain answers to before committing: Q1 (mission clarity), Q14 (governance document ratified), Q25 (budget is real), Q37 (security audit plan), Q47 (data policy), Q51 (legal liability understood), Q87 (90-day plan specific and dated). All seven are addressed in this binder.
Q100 — Spiritual leader: "Why are you — specifically you — the right person to build this, and what in your life has prepared you for the responsibility of what you're describing?" This question cannot be answered by any document. It cannot be answered by strategic planning. It can only be answered by a human life. The EP must answer it honestly and in writing before Day 89 — not to anyone else, but to themselves. This is the final gate.
Section 10Next: Technology Reference →
Section 11
Technology Reference & Specifications
Complete Open-Source Toolchain (30 tools, $0 self-hosted)
| Tool | Function | Version | License | Field Guide Relevance |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| n8n | Workflow orchestration | 1.x | Fair Code / Apache | Core automation pipeline |
| Temporal.io | Durable workflow engine (handles retries/failures) | 1.x | MIT | Fault-tolerant distribution trigger |
| Whisper (OpenAI) | AI transcription, 50+ languages, local/self-hosted | large-v3 | MIT | Model hash verified at load time (Ch.4 dependency security) |
| LibreTranslate | Machine translation, 40+ languages, self-hosted | 1.x | AGPL 3.0 | No data leaves CAPSULE infrastructure |
| Coqui TTS / XTTS-v2 | Text-to-speech voice synthesis, 27 language models | 0.22.x | MPL 2.0 | Model hashes verified; no runtime third-party calls |
| FFmpeg | Audio/video transcoding and processing | 6.x | LGPL 2.1+ | Core pipeline tool; well-maintained; 20+ year track record |
| IPFS (Kubo) | Decentralized content storage and distribution | 0.28.x | MIT/Apache | Censorship-resistant permanent distribution |
| Arweave-js | Permanent blockchain storage; one-time payment | 1.x | MIT | Immutable archive; ~$0.005/MB; 200+ year estimated storage |
| WebTorrent | Browser-native BitTorrent seeding and leeching | 2.x | MIT | P2P distribution amplification; no infrastructure required |
| Prometheus | Metrics collection and alerting | 2.x | Apache 2.0 | Distribution health monitoring; SLA enforcement |
| Grafana | Monitoring dashboards and visualization | 10.x | AGPL 3.0 | Real-time global reach map; public dashboard at /dashboard |
| Loki | Log aggregation and search | 3.x | AGPL 3.0 | Security audit trail; OPSEC incident logging |
| HashiCorp Vault | Secrets management and access control | 1.x | BSL 1.1 | All credentials; no hardcoded keys anywhere (Field Guide Ch.3) |
| Tailscale | Zero-trust encrypted VPN mesh (WireGuard) | Latest | BSD (client) | Admin access only through VPN; IP allowlisting |
| Kubernetes (K3s) | Container orchestration, lightweight | 1.30.x | Apache 2.0 | Multi-region deployment; horizontal scaling |
| Terraform | Infrastructure as code | 1.x | BSL 1.1 | Reproducible infrastructure; disaster recovery (Field Guide Ch.8) |
| ArgoCD | GitOps continuous deployment | 2.x | Apache 2.0 | All deployments through Git; full audit trail |
| GnuPG | Content signing and asymmetric encryption | 2.4.x | GPL 3.0 | All release artifacts signed; Shamir key management |
| OpenTimestamps | Bitcoin blockchain content timestamping | 0.7.x | LGPL 3.0 | Proof of publication date; tamper detection |
| Signal (desktop + mobile) | End-to-end encrypted team communications (EFF SSD) | Latest | AGPL 3.0 | Primary CAPSULE secure comms for all Tier 1 ops |
| Matrix / Element | Encrypted decentralized team chat, self-hosted | Latest | Apache 2.0 | Team coordination; persistent channels; self-hosted instance |
| SecureDrop | Anonymous whistleblower source intake (FPF-developed) | Latest | AGPL 3.0 | Used by 70+ newsrooms; runs over Tor; at /secure |
| Tor Browser | Anonymity network; .onion access; Snowflake bridge | Latest | BSD / MPL 2.0 | Anonymous browsing; .onion mirror; censored region access |
| Liquidsoap | Radio automation and audio stream management | 2.x | GPL 2.0 | Feeds Barix hardware for radio automation |
| Icecast | Open source streaming media server | 2.4.x | GPL 2.0 | Live audio streaming; 200+ listener capacity per instance |
| Mumble | Encrypted low-latency voice coordination | 1.5.x | BSD | Real-time coordination between field ops and base |
| CrowdSec | Collaborative threat intelligence and IP blocking | 2.x | MIT | Crowdsourced DDoS and attack pattern blocking |
| Psiphon | Censorship circumvention; obfuscated tunnels | Latest | GPL 3.0 | Access from censored regions to CAPSULE content |
| Syncthing | Encrypted peer-to-peer file synchronization | 1.x | MPL 2.0 | Offline content sync between nodes; no central server |
| Open Project Linter | Automated open source project quality checker (OpenNews) | Latest | MIT | Required before every public release per Field Guide Ch.4 |
Security Hardware
| Item | Model | Purpose | Cost |
|---|---|---|---|
| Hardware security key (primary) | YubiKey 5 NFC | FIDO2/WebAuthn 2FA for all admin accounts. CPJ explicitly recommends hardware security keys to foil sophisticated hackers. Immune to remote phishing — authentication bound to legitimate domain. | $50–80 each |
| Hardware security key (backup) | YubiKey 5 USB-A | Offline backup key stored separately; required for each Tier 1 admin. Lost primary key cannot lock out account if backup is stored securely. | $50–80 each |
| Encrypted field storage | Kingston IronKey S1000 | Hardware-encrypted USB; auto-wipe after 10 failed attempts; for field key storage and sensitive document transport. FIPS 140-2 Level 3 certified. | $79 (8GB) |
| Air-gapped workstation | Any Linux laptop (permanently air-gapped) | Never connected to internet under any circumstances. USB-boot only. Used for Shamir key ceremony, signing key management, and sensitive document handling. | $300–600 |
Primary Studio Hardware Kit
| Item | Model | Spec | Cost |
|---|---|---|---|
| Broadcast mic (primary) | Shure SM7dB | Dynamic; 50Hz–20kHz; built-in preamp (+28dB); no external preamp needed; XLR | $399 |
| Broadcast mic (backup) | Rode Procaster | Dynamic; 75Hz–18kHz; XLR; broadcast-standard off-axis rejection | $229 |
| Audio interface | Focusrite Scarlett 18i20 (4th gen) | 18-in/20-out; 8 Scarlett preamps; USB-C; 24-bit/192kHz; 26dB/56dB gain | $499 |
| Broadcast console | RØDECaster Pro II | 8-channel; USB-C; Bluetooth; SD card backup recording; works standalone without computer | $699 |
| Field recorder (primary) | Zoom H6 Essential | 6-channel; 32-bit float; standalone; XLR+TRS inputs; records without computer | $299 |
| Emergency recorder | Roland R-07 | Stereo; 32-bit float; built-in mics; Bluetooth monitoring; records even if all other gear fails | $199 |
| UPS (power backup) | APC Back-UPS Pro 1500VA | 1500VA/900W; 8 outlets; USB management; protects against power failure during broadcast | $249 |
| Load-balancing router | Protectli Vault FW4B (pfSense) | 4-port; Intel; 8GB RAM; dual WAN failover; open source firmware; no proprietary backdoors | $449 |
Section 11Next: Sources →
Section 12
Sources, References & Further Reading
Primary Source Documents — All Five Sources Integrated in v2.0
| Document | Organization | Sections Affected | License | URL |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Field Guide to Open Source in the Newsroom (8 chapters) | OpenNews — 25+ newsroom developers and technologists | 4C (Open Source Governance), 5 (volunteer training), 6 (Open Source Steward role), 7 (OPSEC training budget), 8 (90-day plan gates), 11 (Open Project Linter), 12 (sources), 13 (glossary) | MIT License — freely adaptable | fieldguide.opennews.org |
| Surveillance Self-Defense: Activist or Protester Playlist (8 modules, reviewed 2024) | Electronic Frontier Foundation | 4B (OPSEC protocols, all 8 modules mapped), 5 (volunteer training tiers), 8 (90-day OPSEC certification gates), 13 (glossary) | CC BY — freely adaptable | ssd.eff.org/playlist/activist-or-protester |
| Attending a Protest — SSD Module (reviewed November 2024) | Electronic Frontier Foundation | 4 (threat model — device seizure row), 4B (device security checklist, field protocols), 5 (Tier 1 training requirements), 13 (glossary: full-disk encryption, biometric vs. PIN) | CC BY | ssd.eff.org/module/attending-protest |
| Communicating With Others — SSD Module (reviewed August 2024) | Electronic Frontier Foundation | 4B (communications security standards), 5 (volunteer tier training), 11 (Signal in toolchain), 13 (glossary: end-to-end encryption) | CC BY | ssd.eff.org/module/communicating-others |
| Digital Security Advice for Journalists Covering Protests Against Police Violence | Electronic Frontier Foundation (Naomi Gilens & Dave Maass, 2020) | 4 (threat model — device seizure at protests), 4B (field coverage protocols, arrest protocol, facial recognition warning), 5 (field journalist training) | CC BY | eff.org/deeplinks/2020/06/digital-security-advice-journalists-covering-protests |
| Mobile Security Tips: Nine Steps to Prepare Your Phone Before an Action | Freedom of the Press Foundation (Olivia Martin, 2016, updated) | 4B (FPF 9-step checklist, pre-action protocol, encryption, app permissions, backup), 5 (Tier 1 and Tier 2 training), 8 (Phase 2 OPSEC certification), 13 (glossary) | CC BY 4.0 | freedom.press/digisec/blog/mobile-security-protest-preparation-tips-activists |
| CPJ Digital Safety Kit (6 safety notes, updated regularly) | Committee to Protect Journalists — Emergencies Response Team | 4 (YubiKey as standard in threat model), 4B (YubiKey recommendation, phishing awareness, border protocols, password manager standard, platform privacy), 5 (Tier training requirements), 6 (governance: Open Source Steward reports to TAB), 11 (hardware security table) | CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 | cpj.org/safety-kit |
| CPJ Physical and Digital Safety: Arrest and Detention | Committee to Protect Journalists | 4B (arrest protocol, device confiscation response, source protection under coercive conditions) | CPJ standard terms | cpj.org/2021/02/physical-and-digital-safety-arrest-and-detention |
| CPJ US Journalist Assistance Network | Committee to Protect Journalists + partner orgs including FPF, RCFP, RSF | 4B (emergency assistance contacts table), 5 (partner organizations), 12 (organizations reference) | CPJ standard terms | cpj.org/us-journalist-assistance-network |
| Open Project Linter | OpenNews (companion to Field Guide) | 4C (required before every public release), 8 (Phase 1 gate criterion), 11 (toolchain), 13 (glossary) | MIT License | github.com/OpenNewsLabs/open-project-linter |
Statistical Sources
| Statistic | Value | Source | Year |
|---|---|---|---|
| Countries with restricted press freedom | 180 of 195 countries | Freedom House Freedom of the Press | 2024 |
| Journalists killed or imprisoned globally | 320+ annually | CPJ Global Impunity Index | 2024 |
| Without reliable internet access | 2.7 billion | ITU Global Connectivity Report | 2023 |
| Under severe internet restrictions | 1.3B (70+ countries) | Freedom House Freedom on the Net | 2024 |
| Without electricity | 770 million | IEA World Energy Outlook | 2023 |
| Global incarcerated population | ~11 million | World Prison Brief (ICPR) | 2024 |
| Active podcast listeners globally | ~500 million | Edison Research Infinite Dial | 2024 |
| BBC World Service weekly listeners | 364 million | BBC Annual Report | 2024 |
| WhatsApp monthly active users | 2 billion+ | Meta earnings report | 2024 |
| Whisper multilingual transcription accuracy | 85–99% by language | OpenAI Whisper Technical Report | 2022 |
Key Organizations
| Organization | Relevance to CAPSULE | URL |
|---|---|---|
| Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) | Digital rights law; Surveillance Self-Defense (ssd.eff.org); Press freedom; Atlas of Surveillance; Privacy Badger; encryption policy | eff.org |
| Freedom of the Press Foundation (FPF) | SecureDrop (source intake, at /secure); Dangerzone; digital security training; mobile security for activists; press freedom advocacy | freedom.press |
| Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ) | Digital Safety Kit; Emergency assistance (WhatsApp: +1 206 590 6191); arrest/detention protocols; border crossing guidance; US Journalist Assistance Network | cpj.org |
| OpenNews | Field Guide to Open Source in the Newsroom; open source journalism community; Source publication; OpenNews fellowships | opennews.org · fieldguide.opennews.org |
| Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press (RCFP) | Free legal support; First Amendment representation; Legal Hotline: 1-800-336-4243; shield law database | rcfp.org |
| Access Now | Digital rights; internet shutdown documentation; Digital Security Helpline (24/7); accessnow.org/help | accessnow.org |
| National Lawyers Guild (NLG) | Legal observers at protests; arrestee support hotlines; First Amendment legal defense; civil liberties | nlg.org |
| Tor Project | Anonymity network; .onion services; Snowflake bridge for censored regions; source protection | torproject.org |
| Internet Archive | Permanent digital preservation; Wayback Machine; legal protection as library under US law | archive.org |
| Article 19 | International free expression law; content rights globally | article19.org |
| Reporters Without Borders (RSF) | Global press freedom index; journalist protection; digital security resources; international advocacy | rsf.org |
| Native Public Media / AIROS | Native American radio network; tribal media sovereignty; indigenous broadcast rights | nativepublicmedia.org |
| Prometheus Radio Project | LPFM licensing; community radio advocacy; 4,000+ US community stations | prometheusradio.org |
| 350.org | Global climate justice movement; grassroots infrastructure; coalition partner | 350.org |
| Color of Change | Racial justice digital organizing; corporate accountability campaigns; coalition partner | colorofchange.org |
| Indigenous Environmental Network (IEN) | Indigenous land, water, and climate justice; community media networks; distribution partner | ienearth.org |
Social Justice & Political Theory References
| Work | Author(s) | Relevance to CAPSULE |
|---|---|---|
| Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of the Mass Media | Noam Chomsky & Edward S. Herman | Foundational analytical framework for understanding corporate media as propaganda system — the problem CAPSULE was created to address |
| The Wretched of the Earth | Frantz Fanon | Decolonization theory; anti-colonial liberation framework; editorial standard for whose voices the network amplifies |
| Rules for Radicals: A Practical Primer for Realistic Radicals | Saul Alinsky | Community organizing methodology; power analysis; coalition-building for distributed movement media |
| Pedagogy of the Oppressed | Paulo Freire | Liberation education; consciousness-raising as primary function of content; community as co-creator not audience |
| An Indigenous Peoples' History of the United States | Roxanne Dunbar-Ortiz | Indigenous sovereignty framework; editorial standards for indigenous content; historical context for cultural sovereignty value |
| The Shock Doctrine: The Rise of Disaster Capitalism | Naomi Klein | Disaster capitalism analysis; context for censorship-resistance mandate; why free information matters most during crises |
| Sister Outsider: Essays and Speeches | Audre Lorde | LGBTQIA+ liberation theory; intersectionality as editorial framework; "the master's tools will never dismantle the master's house" |
| A People's History of the United States | Howard Zinn | Counter-narrative historical framework; whose stories get suppressed and why; editorial mandate for CAPSULE |
| This Bridge Called My Back: Writings by Radical Women of Color | Cherríe Moraga & Gloria Anzaldúa (eds.) | Intersectional feminism; BIPOC and LGBTQIA+ voices; coalition theory that informs Community Advisory Council design |
| The Art of War / On Guerrilla Warfare | Sun Tzu; Mao Zedong | Strategic communication and asymmetric information warfare theory; applied to censorship-resistant distribution architecture design |
Section 12Next: Appendices →
Section 13
Appendices
Appendix A — IYKYKNews.com Repository Structure
| Path | Contents | Access | v2.0 Status |
|---|---|---|---|
| /binder | This complete project binder (HTML v2 + PDF + DOCX) | Public (password-protected on Ghost) | Live — this document |
| /governance | Charter, bylaws, values document, meeting minutes, Open Source Steward charter | Public | Draft — requires legal entity |
| /technical | Architecture diagrams, deployment configs, code repository links, dependency audit reports | Public (non-sensitive) | Draft |
| /security | Security audit reports (redacted), threat model, OPSEC protocols, incident logs | Tier 1 authenticated only | Draft |
| /opsec | OPSEC training materials derived from EFF SSD + FPF + CPJ. Published CC BY 4.0. Free for anyone to use. NEW in v2.0. | Public — OPSEC is for everyone | New in v2.0 |
| /opensource | GitHub/Gitea repo links, contributor guidelines, license policies, Open Project Linter reports, dependency audit, CODE_OF_CONDUCT. NEW in v2.0. | Public | New in v2.0 |
| /editorial | Content standards, style guide, fact-checking protocols, language localization standards | Public | Draft |
| /volunteer | Onboarding materials, training modules, OPSEC certification, role descriptions, Field Guide contributor guidelines | Tier-appropriate access | Draft |
| /dashboard | Live distribution metrics, global reach map, IPFS peer count, system status, open source contributor activity | Public | Phase 1 delivery |
| /legal | Entity documents, volunteer agreements, content licenses, press credential policy | Public (non-PII) | Draft — requires entity |
| /press | Media kit, EP bio, press releases, talking points, organizational description | Public | Phase 0 delivery |
| /secure | SecureDrop anonymous source intake instance (FPF-operated protocol, Tor-based) | Public (via Tor .onion) | Phase 2 delivery |
Appendix B — Comprehensive Glossary
| Term | Definition | Source |
|---|---|---|
| IPFS | InterPlanetary File System — peer-to-peer distributed file storage where content is addressed by cryptographic hash (CID). Cannot be altered after publication because any change produces a different address. 500+ public gateways globally. | Protocol Labs / EFF SSD |
| Arweave | Blockchain-based permanent data storage network. One-time payment funds estimated 200+ years of storage across 1,000+ decentralized nodes. Content cannot be deleted once confirmed. | Arweave Foundation |
| Shamir Secret Sharing | Cryptographic scheme (Adi Shamir, 1979) that splits a secret into N parts, of which any M parts can reconstruct the original. CAPSULE uses 3-of-5 for master trigger, 2-of-3 for infrastructure admin and open source signing key. | IACR / CAPSULE Security Architecture |
| Dead man's switch | Automated trigger that activates when an operator fails to send a regular heartbeat signal within 72 hours. Guarantees publication even if the operator is detained, incapacitated, or coerced into silence. | CAPSULE Security Architecture |
| Full-disk encryption | Encryption of all data on a device's storage medium, protecting data at rest. iOS enables by default when a passcode is set. Android: Settings → Security & Privacy → Device Unlock. Essential before any field operation. (EFF SSD: "Attending a Protest," Nov. 2024) | EFF SSD |
| FIDO2 / WebAuthn | Modern hardware security key authentication standard. YubiKey implements this protocol. Immune to phishing attacks because cryptographic authentication is bound to the legitimate domain — a phishing site cannot capture the authentication response. (CPJ Digital Safety Kit) | FIDO Alliance / CPJ |
| End-to-end encryption (E2EE) | Encryption where only the communicating parties can read messages. Even the service provider cannot access message content. Signal implements E2EE using the Signal Protocol. "The next best thing to communicating in person." (EFF SSD: "Communicating With Others," Aug. 2024) | EFF SSD |
| Signal | Open source end-to-end encrypted messaging and voice/video application. CAPSULE's primary secure comms tool for all Tier 1 ops. Supports disappearing messages. Free. Does not store message metadata. (EFF SSD; FPF) | Signal Foundation / EFF SSD |
| SecureDrop | Open source whistleblower submission system developed by Freedom of the Press Foundation. Used by 70+ newsrooms globally including the New York Times, Washington Post, and Guardian. Runs exclusively over Tor. Self-hostable at zero cost. | FPF / freedom.press |
| Tor | The Onion Router — anonymity network routing traffic through multiple encrypted relays operated by volunteers. .onion addresses (hidden services) are accessible only within the Tor network and cannot be easily blocked or traced. | Tor Project / EFF SSD |
| Domain fronting | Routes internet traffic through a major CDN (Cloudflare, AWS, Google) to disguise the true destination of the request. Bypasses censorship based on domain name or IP address because the visible traffic appears to be to the CDN's IP address. | EFF SSD |
| Meshtastic | Open-source project using LoRa (Long Range) sub-GHz radio chips to create encrypted peer-to-peer mesh networks without internet infrastructure. Each node relays messages. Range up to 10km per node; mesh extends range indefinitely. | Meshtastic Project |
| OPSEC | Operational Security — a systematic process of identifying, protecting, and controlling sensitive information about operations, personnel, and methods from adversarial collection. Originated in US military; adopted by journalist and activist communities. (EFF SSD; CPJ Safety Kit) | EFF SSD / CPJ |
| Open Project Linter | Automated command-line checklist tool from OpenNews that tests project directories for good open source practices: documentation completeness, code quality markers, license presence, security hygiene. Companion tool to the Field Guide. MIT License, freely usable. | OpenNews / fieldguide.opennews.org |
| Semantic versioning | Version numbering scheme (Major.Minor.Patch, e.g., 2.1.3) where each number communicates compatibility: major = breaking change; minor = backward-compatible new feature; patch = backward-compatible bug fix. Required for all CAPSULE releases. (OpenNews Field Guide Ch. 4) | semver.org / OpenNews Field Guide |
| YubiKey | Hardware security key from Yubico implementing FIDO2/WebAuthn, OTP, and PIV. Immune to remote phishing. CPJ explicitly recommends YubiKey as the standard 2FA hardware for journalists to "foil sophisticated hackers." CAPSULE requires one per Tier 1 operator. | Yubico / CPJ Digital Safety Kit |
| Barix Exstreamer | Hardware IP audio codec used in professional broadcast radio. Receives an audio stream (Icecast/SHOUTcast) over IP and outputs analog audio for connection to a broadcast transmitter. Enables radio automation without a computer at the transmitter site. | Barix AG |
| LPFM | Low-Power FM — FCC-licensed FM broadcast stations at 100 watts or less, approximately 3-mile coverage radius. Over 4,000 community LPFM stations licensed in the United States. $0 license fee; community groups eligible. | FCC / Prometheus Radio Project |
| SINPO | Signal, Interference, Noise, Propagation, Overall — a 5-parameter scale (each 1–5) for reporting shortwave radio reception quality. Used by listeners worldwide to report signal quality to broadcasters. CAPSULE uses SINPO reports as Tier 3 distribution verification. | IARU / shortwave broadcast standard |
| HF / Shortwave | High Frequency radio (3–30 MHz). Propagates by reflecting off the ionosphere, enabling global transmission without satellite or internet infrastructure. Cannot be geographically blocked without jamming an entire frequency band — a technically challenging and internationally illegal act. | ITU Radio Regulations |
| CODE_OF_CONDUCT.md | A document specifying standards of acceptable behavior for contributors to an open source project. Required for all CAPSULE repositories per OpenNews Field Guide Ch. 6: "Having a contributor code of conduct from the start can help show your commitment to anti-harassment, avoid future rules-lawyering around what is or isn't harassment, and help you shut down toxic behavior fast." | OpenNews Field Guide Ch. 6 |
| Contributor Covenant | A widely adopted code of conduct for open source communities. Recommended as a starting point in OpenNews Field Guide Ch. 6. Used by thousands of open source projects. contributor-covenant.org | OpenNews Field Guide Ch. 6 |
| n8n | Open source node-based workflow automation tool. Connects APIs, services, and custom code into automated pipelines triggered by events (webhooks, schedules, file changes). CAPSULE's primary distribution orchestration engine. Self-hosted instance; no data leaves infrastructure. | n8n GmbH / CAPSULE Pipeline |
Appendix C — Contact & Repository Index
| Item | Detail |
|---|---|
| Project name | CAPSULE — IYKYK Newsroom |
| Repository | IYKYKNews.com |
| Project binder (this document) | IYKYKNews.com/binder — v2.0, June 2026 |
| Live distribution dashboard | IYKYKNews.com/dashboard |
| OPSEC resources (NEW v2.0) | IYKYKNews.com/security — public, CC BY 4.0 |
| Open source code and repos (NEW v2.0) | IYKYKNews.com/opensource → links to GitHub/Gitea |
| Volunteer inquiry and onboarding | IYKYKNews.com/volunteer |
| Press and media resources | IYKYKNews.com/press |
| Secure anonymous source contact (SecureDrop) | IYKYKNews.com/secure → Tor .onion address |
| Governance documents | IYKYKNews.com/governance |
| Editorial standards | IYKYKNews.com/editorial |
| Document version | 2.0 — Working Draft |
| Sources integrated in v2.0 | OpenNews Field Guide to Open Source in the Newsroom (MIT) · EFF SSD Activist Playlist (CC BY) · EFF Digital Security for Journalists at Protests · FPF Mobile Security Tips (CC BY 4.0) · CPJ Digital Safety Kit (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0) |
| Date compiled | June 2026 |
| Document status | Pre-launch prospectus — not for public distribution without EP approval. Password-protected at IYKYKNews.com/binder. |
CAPSULE — IYKYK Newsroom
If You Know, You Know.
IYKYKNews.com · Project Binder Version 2.0 · June 2026
Incorporating: OpenNews Field Guide · EFF SSD · FPF DigiSec · CPJ Safety Kit